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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 25
La Raza Unida Party v. Dean: Texas Minority Party
Nomination Procedure Made More Burdensome
Prior to the November elections of 1970, La Raza Unida' attempted to
qualify its political organization for ballot positions in county and precinct
elections.' The procedure to be followed for such qualification is outlined in
the Texas Election Code.' It is not made clear in the statute, however, whether
the petition for ballot status should contain the names of the nominees. The
party submitted its petition without listing the nominees, and the county
judges and clerks refused to put La Raza on the ballot. The party sought
writs of mandamus from the Texas supreme court4 to compel the county
officials to put the party on the ballot. Held, petition denied: The party should
have certified the nominees before obtaining signatures on the nominating
petition. La Raza Unida Party v. Dean, 462 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1970).
I. REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The first amendment guarantee of freedom of association' is a necessary
complement to the right to vote, at least under our present system of voting
by political party. Although the amendment itself originally applied only to
the federal government, judicial construction of the fourteenth amendment
has made it applicable to the states as well.' Generally, only a "compelling
state interest" can justify the restriction of first amendment freedoms."
As a result of the privileged rights of suffrage and freedom of association,
the right to form and associate with political groups is unrestrained so long as
another constitutional provision is not thereby transgressed.8 It has been
' La Raza Unida is a coalition of Mexican-American citizens. Spokesmen for the group
claim it to be more of a concept than a political party, but for purposes of this case it is
considered a political party.
2 The Texas counties involved are Dimmit, La Salle, and Zavala. La Raza Unida Party
v. Dean, 462 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1970).
3TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 13.54 (1967):
Any political party without a State organization desiring to nominate candi-
dates for county and precinct offices only may nominate such candidates there-
for under the provisions of this title by primary elections or by a county con-
vention held on the legal primary election day, which convention shall be
composed of delegates from various election precincts in said county, elected
therein at primary conventions held in such precincts between the hours of
8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on the date set by law. All nominations made by
any such parties shall be certified to the county clerk by the chairman of the
county committee of such party, and, after taking the same course as nomina-
tions of other parties so certified, shall be printed on the official ballot in a
separate column, headed by the name of the, party; provided, a written appli-
cation for such printing shall have been made to the county judge, signed and
sworn to by three per cent (3%) of the entire vote cast in such county at
the last general election.4 See, e.g., Roy v. Drake, 292 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956); Clancy v.
Clough, 30 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928).
-'The first amendment does not in so many words enumerate a "freedom of association."
However, the courts have included this right among first amendment guarantees. UMW,
Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and cases cited therein.
'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
1 In this area would fall the cases in which political groups are formed by private in-
dividuals in order to impose private racial restrictions. The discussion of these attempts
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stated that the people have an "inalienable" right to organize and operate
political parties." To have an effective voice in government the individual
must be able to align himself with others who think the way he does, and
his right to do so must not be lightly abridged. "No right is more precious
in a free society than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live."'"
The internal management of the political party is left largely to the party
itself." As an incident to the broad control over elections and election pro-
cedures" given to the states, however, the party is closely regulated in those
situations where it comes into direct contact with these elections." The pri-
mary purpose of allowing the states this regulatory power is to avoid fraud
and wrongdoing in the election processes." This control also has been sub-
stantiated as a general exercise of the police power," as the regulation of an
organ charged with the public interest, " as the exercise of a plenary power,'
or as a condition attached to the privilege of appearing on the public ballot. "
II. ARTICLE 13.54
In the interest of clarity and uniformity of application, election regulations
are generally codified. Texas is one state whose standards are almost entirely
statutory." Nevertheless, the precise question presented in La Raza Unida
Party v. Dean" has not been determined previously. The few cases under
the statute are not in point." However, other courts under somewhat similar
statutes or situations have been much more liberal in construing the election
procedure so as to allow the independent candidate or the minority party to
be placed on the ballot.
For example, in State ex rel. Harry v. Ice" a statute called for a certificate
acknowledging signatures on a petition to nominate a minority candidate."
would be too lengthy to consider here; suffice it to say that if such groups are deemed to
be performing a "public function" such that their action may be considered state action,
they can be reached under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
' Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929).
"*Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
" See note 8 supra.
"DeCesare v. Board of Elections, 104 R.I. 136, 242 A.2d 421 (1968); State ex rel.
Edwards v. Reyna, 160 Tex. 404, 333 S.W.2d 832 (1960). Statements to this effect could
be found in every jurisdiction.
" This regulation is subject to constitutional limitations. See Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232 (1921); Ray v. Blair, 257 Ala. 151, 57 So. 2d 395 (1952); Koy v. Schneider,
110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. 880 (1920). For example, it is subject to the right to suffrage.
Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. 880 (1920).4 Fugate v. Johnston, 251 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952).
"Hooper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L. 562, 56 A. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
"'Lett v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 129 So. 33 (1930).
"'Kenneweg v. Allegheny County Comm'rs, 102 Md. 119, 62 A. 249 (1905).
"Commonwealth v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 63 N.E. 421 (1902). For a general discus-
sion, see Comment, Political Parties and Primary Elections Under Fifteenth Amendment,
21 CALIF. L. Rxv. 240 (1933).
"Hamilton v. Munroe, 116 Tex. 153, 287 S.W. (1926); Brewster v. Massey,
232 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950), mandamus overruled; Hamilton v.
Monroe, 287 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1926), error dismissed.
0462 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1970).
"1See Notes of Decisions, 9 TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. 511 (1967).
"2207 Ind. 65, 191 N.E. 155 (1934).
'Law of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 219, §5 7, 9, [1901] Ind. Laws 62 (repealed 1945); Law
of Mar. 4, 1905, ch. 113, S 12, [1905] Ind. Laws 64 (repealed 1945).
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The petition was filed before the statutory deadline, but the acknowledgement
was late. The court, nonetheless, held this to be sufficient compliance. In
Bacon v. Holzman" a restrictive time limit caused disqualification of some
signers of nominating petitions for candidates for municipal offices, but the
court refused to enforce the time limit strictly to cause disqualification of
candidates.
In an earlier Texas case, Morris v. Mims,25 a new minority party attempted
to nominate candidates for state offices. In the absence of any statute defining
the procedure to be followed, the party followed the procedure required of
more established parties. The Secretary of State refused them ballot position,
but the Texas court of civil appeals said that any reasonable method showing
appreciable public support for the party was sufficient.
III. LA RAZA UNIDA PARTY V. DEAN
The court in Raza Unida began by setting out the text of article 13.54 of
the Texas Election Code, and then restated it in the order the court thought
it should be followed. " The crucial point to be determined was whether the
nominees were required to be on the petition before it was circulated for
signing. While the statute was not clear on this point, the court construed
the statute to require it. This, said the court, was "the only logical and reason-
able interpretation."2 ' The court feared that if this were not the procedure, the
new party could foist unacceptable nominees on the signers of the petition.
There is, however, a substantially more logical and reasonable interpretation
that should have been applied here. If the party nominees are known before
signatures for the petition are sought, the signatories have no voice in the
selection of the nominees. They are asked, in effect, to ratify the choices of
the party leaders. This seems to be putting the cart before the horse. The
nominees are choosing the party, rather than the party electing the nominees."8
24264 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. 111. 1967).
25224 S.W. 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920).
21As interpreted by the court, art. 13.54 applies chronologically as follows when the
nomination is by convention:
(1) election at precinct conventions of delegates to a county convention;
(2) nomination of candidates by the county convention; (3) certification by
the party county chairman of nominees to the county clerk; (4) signing under
oath, by qualified voters, equal to or greater than three per cent of the entire
vote cast in the county at the last general election, of a written application
with the county judge; (5) filing of the written application with the county
judge; (6) printing of the names of the nominees on the ballot in a separate
column under the name of the party.
462 S.W.2d at 571.
27 Id.
" In fact, a federal court has stated that when a party is formed from the top down,
it is to be treated as a campaign for an independent. The independent candidate was George
Wallace. The court stated:
This has all the appearance of a fictional party formed from the top down for
the purpose of trying to comply with the Ohio law to get Mr. Wallace's name
on the ballot rather than a duly organized party from the bottom up in search
of a leader . . . . He has built a national organization around himself. This
classifies him as a potential independent candidate rather than as a party
candidate.
Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 988-89 (S.D. Ohio 1968). This type of
analysis, properly applied in Raza Unida, would result in the characterization of the petition
as one to nominate a party rather than any particular individual or individuals.
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The court stated that it was interpreting the statute in harmony with
statutes governing the right of independent candidates to a place on the
ballot. While the court was correct to construe the statute in context with
other election provisions, " 9 it is apparent that the court harmonized it with
the wrong ones. The aim of an independent candidate is to get his name on
the ballot, while the primary goal of a new party is to get the party designa-
tion on the ballot. It would seem more logical to govern a new political
party nomination petition in line with the treatment of established political
parties. Thus, the better procedure would be to insure first that the three per
cent requirement for the party can be met, and once met and certified, to
have the nominating convention."0
The thrust of the court's argument is that the state has an interest in seeing
that a voter does not have to act in ignorance of the consequences of his
act. It is difficult to see how that reasoning applies. The voter knows what
he is doing without the procedure required by the court: he is hoping to
form a new party in which he can choose nominees more in tune with his
way of thinking. He signs the petition in the same way that the Democrat
or Republican registers-not knowing at the time who his party's candidate
will be, but knowing he will have a chance in the primary to vote for the
man of his choice.
It would further seem that the court was unduly strict in interpreting the
statute, especially in the light of the constitutional guarantees involved."
Election statutes in general are to be construed in the same manner as other
statutes." However, in view of the favored position of the right to vote,
courts will often liberally interpret those statutes whose strict interpretation
might weaken that right." In situations like the one before this court other
courts have considered the applicable statutes in a way that would allow the
newly formed party to be admitted to the election, if possible.' Frequently the
procedures outlined in election statutes are deemed mandatory only if they are
necessary to preserve the right of suffrage." That reservation would not be
applicable here.
The dissenting opinion brings out the fact that La Raza Unida made every
conceivable administrative effort to find out if the procedure they had followed
was the correct one. In two opinions from the Attorney General 6 and one from
"See, e.g., Ulmer v. Currie, 245 Miss. 285, 147 So. 2d 286 (1962).
"See note 28 supra.
31 See notes 5-9 supra.
"Duncan v. Burke, 234 Cal. App. 2d 171, 44 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1965); Ulmer v. Currie,
245 Miss. 285, 147 So. 2d 286 (1962); Wessendorf v. Donohue, 54 Misc. 2d 1045, 284
N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 1095, 283 N.Y.S.2d 879, aff'd, 28 App.
Div. 2d 1095, 285 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967).
"Bacon v. Holzman, 264 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Walker v. Thetford, 418
S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; Fugate v. Johnston, 251
S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952); State ex rel. Paggi v. Fletcher, 50
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1932), error dismissed.
"State ex rel. Richardson v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 707, 198 P. 1118 (1920); Morrissey
v. Wait, 92 Neb. 271, 138 N.W. 186 (1912); Morris v. Mims, 224 S.W. 587 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1920). See also notes 23-25 supra, and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Ferrell v. Harris County Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 23, 241 S.W.2d 242
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951).
"TEx. ATT'y GEN. OP. Nos. M-621, M-646 (1970).
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the Secretary of State,37 the party received conflicting views. However, neither
opinion indicated that La Raza Unida was in error on the technicality on
which the majority based its holding.38 "We ought not, therefore, to hold, if
we can avoid such a result, that our election laws should be construed to
prevent the organization of new parties, the advocacy of new political views,
or the adoption of new designations."" This should be especially true when
the new party has done all that could be asked of it in an attempt to comply
with the statute.
From a practical viewpoint the decision is also open to attack. In the for-
mation of new political parties, timing is often a critical factor. Candidates
from a major party are not likely to switch their allegiance to a splinter
party until they have exhausted their chances for nomination in the more
broadly based party." Thus, the minority party under the construction of
this court is forced into selecting nominees early, who may have far less
chance of election than a more widely known individual the party might
obtain later.
There is no mention in the opinion of any possible constitutional objections
to the decision. Whether there are such objections most likely depends on the
impact of a recent United States Supreme Court decision, 1 where the Court
implied that the constitutional harm need not be a direct result of the appli-
cation of the statute. It may be that the right to vote is substantially diminished
if for technical reasons a citizen is not allowed to vote for an emerging new
party.' Also, the right of freedom of association is weakened when the new
group is thwarted from its lawful purpose as a result of technical discrepan-
cies in its formation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The statute construed here regulates the right of individuals to form
political parties and to petition for nomination of persons politically com-
patible with them for public office. Certainly this should not be an unre-
strained right, or election ballots would be so long as to be unmanageable.
" Secretary of state opinions are not published. The dissent mentions the existence of
this particular opinion. 462 S.W.2d at 572.
"'The dissent states that the attorney general opinions went against the parry and the
secretary of state opinion for the party. 462 S.W.2d at 572. However, at least in the attorney
general's opinions, the question resolved against the party was not the issue decided by the
court. The point resolved against La Raza dealt with their apparent failure to file the peti-
tion in the current voting year. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-646 (1970). La Raza asked
the attorney general whether the nominees should be named before circulating the petition.
The opinion reads:
In answer to your question, you are advised that the written application filed
with the county judge may be filed before the new political party has held its
primary county convention for the reason that Article 13.54 does not place a
fixed time limit on the filing of such application, but merely states that such
application 'shall have been made' to the county judge.
TEx. A-r'Y GEN. Op. No. M-621 (1970).
" Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 92 N.W. 93 (1902).4 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968). See also Kozusko & Lambert, The
Uncertain Impact of Williams v. Rhodes on Qualifying Minority Parties for the Ballot, 6
HARV. J. LEGis. 236, 250 (1969).
41 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Williams involved the right of George Wal-
lace to ballot position for the presidential elections in Ohio.42 id. at 31.
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